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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellants Merrill Cook and Merrill Cook for Congress 
Committee (hereinafter "Cook") appeal from the final Judgment of 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable 
Sandra N. Peuler presiding, entered December 20, 2000 in favor of 
Appellee R.T. Nielson Co. (hereinafter "RTNC" or "Appellee"). This 
Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2 (3) (j) (2000) . 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court err in entering judgment on 
a special verdict of the jury finding an oral modification of an 
agreement that by its terms could not be orally modified when such 
oral modification is not a recognizable cause of action under Utah 
law? 
This issue was preserved below. E.g., [R73]1; [R2028-2040, 
R2232-2242, 2450-2460]; Trial Transcript, Day 1, pp. 83-84. 
This issue is a question of law for which no deference is 
given to the determination of the trial court. E.g. , Provo City v. 
Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979); State v. Haston. 
846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993). 
ISSUE NO. 2 : Did the trial court err in awarding $195,800.93 
in attorney's fees to RTNC under a clause of the written agreement 
providing recovery of fees for "litigation brought to enforce any 
provision of this agreement" when only Cook prevailed on any claims 
1
 All citations are to the record as indexed by the Clerk 
of the Third Judicial District Co^rt pursuant to Rule 11(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
under the written agreement and there was no evidence of any other 
agreement regarding attorney's fees? 
The issue was preserved below. E.g., [R2028-2040, 2232-2242, 
2450-2460] 
This issue is an interpretation of the contract of the parties 
and is therefore a question of law to which this Court gives no 
deference to the ruling of the trial court. E.g., Provo City v. 
Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979). 
ISSUE NO. 3: Did the trial court err in awarding Appellee 
RTNC $195,800.93 for attorney's fees when there was no finding and 
no evidences that those fees were incurred, owed or the 
responsibility of RTNC? 
This issue was preserved below. E.g., [R2028-2040, 2232-2242, 
2450-2060] 
This issue of whether it was proper to award attorneys fees 
claimed by RTNC without evidence they were incurred, owed or the 
responsibility of RTNC is a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. E.g., Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc1s, 910 P. 2d 
1252, 1257 (Utah App. 1996) (citing Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 
P.2d 496, 499 (Utah App. 1992)). 
ISSUE NO. 4: Did the trial court err in awarding Appellee 
RTNC $195,800.93 for attorney's fees under the following 
circumstances: 
a) When there were no contemporaneous or other documents 
itemizing the attorney's work or its reasonableness or 
necessity? 
2 
b) When there were no contemporaneous or other documents 
from which the trial court could segregate the claimed 
fees between compensable versus non-compensable claims? 
Each of these issues were preserved below. E.g., [R2028-2040, 
2232-2242, 2450-2460] 
This issue of the whether the amount of the award of 
attorney's fees was proper is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc*s, 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 
(Utah App. 1996). 
ISSUE NO. 5: Did the trial court err in refusing to award 
Cook his attorney's fees resulting from RTNCfs breach of the 
parties' written agreement? 
This issue was preserved below. E.g., [R2028-2040] 
Whether attorney's fees are recoverable in an action is a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. E.g., Selvage 
v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc's, 910. P. 2d 1252, 1257 (Utah App. 
1996) (citing Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 
App. 1992)). 
III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL/STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no determinative constitutional or statutory 
provisions. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW. 
Appellee RTNC brought this action against Cook asserting the 
following claims: three (3) separate claims for breach of oral 
contract, two (2) separate claims for breach of written contract 
3 
(i.e., the "Services Agreement"), a claim for account stated, and 
a claim for quantum meruit. [Rl-12] Cook answered the Complaint 
and asserted counter claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and 
for an award of attorney's fees. [R66-97] 
The claims proceeded to trial before the Third District Court, 
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler presiding. The matter was tried to a 
jury during the period of April 3 through April 14, 2000. At 
trial, only the following claims were submitted to the jury: 
1) RTNC's claim that the parties' written agreement was 
orally modified and that Cook breached the orally 
modified agreement; 
2) RTNC's claim for quantum meruit during the election 
cycle; 
3) RTNC's claim for quantum meruit during the post-election 
phase; 
4) Cook's claim for breach of contract; and 
5) Cook's claim for breach of fiduciary duty. [R1941-1947] 
By special verdict, the jury found that the parties had modified 
their written Services Agreement and that Cook had breached this 
modified contract by failing to pay to RTNC the amount of $182,483. 
[R1941-1942] The jury further found that RTNC was entitled to 
recover $11,509 under its unjust enrichment claim for services 
provided during the post-election cycle. [R1943] Finally, the 
jury found that RTNC had breached the parties' written Services 
Agreement and awarded Cook $19,521 as a result of that breach. 
[R1946] This was the only finding by the jury that the written 
Services Agreement had been breached. 
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Thereafter on April 24, 2000, Cook moved for an award of its 
attorney's fees pursuant to the written Services Agreement which 
provided the recovery of fees for "litigation brought to enforce 
any provision of this agreement", and pursuant to the jury's 
finding that RTNC had breached that written agreement. [R2032-
2040] RTNC also moved for an award of its attorney's fees even 
though there was no finding that Cook breached the terms of the 
written Services Agreement. On May 15, 2000 the trial court denied 
Cook's Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees and indicated that 
RTNC was the "only party who may be entitled to an award of fees 
and costs in this matter." [R2191-2193] 
RTNC filed an Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs which 
failed to include any evidence that the claimed fees were incurred 
by or an obligation of RTNC, or supporting documentation (such as 
contemporaneous billing entries or records). [R2071-2077] Cook 
objected to the Affidavit and the trial court sustained that 
objection by noting that RTNC's counsel: 1) failed to itemize 
specific work performed and the time spent in each aspect of the 
work by each individual; and 2) failed to segregate fees incurred 
on compensable versus non-compensable claims. [R2356-2360] The 
trial court then gave counsel for RTNC another opportunity to 
substantiate its claims for attorney's fees. A Supplemental 
Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs was filed, again without any 
evidence that any fees had actually been incurred and without any 
contemporaneous supporting documentation. [2381-2408] This 
Supplemental Affidavit was again objected to by Cook. The trial 
5 
court, however, awarded RTNC attorney1s fees in the amount of 
$195,800.93, even though there was no evidence that RTNC incurred 
the fees claimed. [R2481-2483] 
On December 20, 2000 the trial court entered Judgment in favor 
of RTNC and against Cook in the principal amount of $174,471.00 for 
the breach of an orally modified written contract and unjust 
enrichment claims, and $195,800.93 for attorney's fees. Cook filed 
its Notice of Appeal on January 5, 2001. 
2. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS. 
A. FACTS RELEVANT TO MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT ISSUE. 
1. In early 1996, Merrill Cook was a candidate for the 
United States House of Representatives for the Second Congressional 
District of Utah. [R2 at H 6] The Merrill Cook for Congress 
Committee was a campaign committee organized and existing under the 
Federal Election Act. [R2 at H 3] 
2. At all relevant times Appellee RTNC was a Utah 
corporation in the business of, inter alia, providing management, 
consulting, staffing, fund raising, polling, media, research, and 
advertising services for Republican political candidates. [R2] 
3. On March 5, 1996 Cook entered into a written agreement 
with RTNC, which RTNC drafted, referred to as the "Services 
Agreement". Under the Services Agreement, RTNC would provide fund 
raising, polling, advertising, and "general consulting" concerning 
Mr. Cook's 1996 campaign for re-election to Congress. [Trial Ex. 
17] 
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In particular, under the Services Agreement, RTNC agreed to do 
the following: 
In accepting retainment by [Cook], Nielson shall 
undertake and assume the responsibility of performing for 
and on behalf of [Cook] all duties and responsibilities 
which are reasonably necessary to fulfill the purposes of 
this Agreement as set forth above. 
In particular, Nielson shall oversee all general 
consulting for the campaign. This shall include campaign 
planning and strategy, convention management, delegate 
stacking and targeting, and other duties involved with 
general consulting. Nielson shall be required to oversee 
and administer all PAC fund raising activities. In 
addition Nielson shall provide polling, and advertising 
as required and needed by [Cook]. 
[Cook] further covenants and agrees that Nielson is 
entitled to oversee and conduct all PAC fund raising, 
consulting, polling and advertising and that Client will 
not conduct any of these activities without first 
consulting with Nielson and will not in any way interfere 
with Nielson's efforts. 
Nielson shall receive 15% of the gross amount of all PAC 
monies received, regardless of the source. This agreement to 
perform PAC fund raising shall extend for a period of four 
months after the general election date. 
(b) General Consulting. Nielson shall receive the sum of 
$40,000 for consulting services through May 4, 1996. After 
May 4, 19 96 and during the periods of the primary and general 
elections Nielson shall receive $4,000 a month for general 
consulting. . . . 
Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, f 2, 3 & 4.2 
4. In the Services Agreement the parties agreed that 
11
 [a]dditional services and fees may be negotiated and agreed to at 
2
 Under this Agreement, Cook paid RTNC approximately 
$230,000.00, [Trial Transcript, Day 3, pp. 87-88]. 
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a later date." Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, % 4.(b). It was 
also agreed, however, that: 
. . . No change or modification of this Agreement shall 
be valid or binding unless it is in writing and signed bv 
the party intended to be bound. 
Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, U 15 (emphasis added). 
5. At trial Mr. Nielson admitted there were no written 
modifications to the Services Agreement: 
Q. Would you turn back to Exhibit 17 [the Services 
Agreement] , please. Turn to the last page of Exhibit 17. 
Look at paragraph 15. 
Are you familiar with that paragraph? 
A. Yes, I've read through it. 
Q. Okay. Now the essence of that paragraph says that the 
only modifications to this agreement that are allowed are 
those that are in writing, correct? 
A. That's what it says. 
Q. Signed by the parties? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now, you didn't do that here, did you? 
A. No, we did not. 
Trial Transcript, Day 2, p. 165. 
The oral modification claimed by RTNC was alleged to have resulted 
from certain discussions between Messrs. Nielson and Cook. E.g., 
[Rl-12] 
6. At the conclusion of the trial, the only breach of 
contract claim RTNC submitted to the jury was for breach of an oral 
modification of the Services Agreement. The jury was not asked 
whether Cook breached the Services Agreement or whether the parties 
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entered into any new oral agreement. The jury's Special Verdict on 
RTNC's breach of contract claim was as follows: 
1. Did the RTNC and [Cook] modify their Services 
Agreement as alleged by the RTNC? 
Answer: Yes. 
2. . . . If your answer to 1. is "Yes", did Merrill Cook 
and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee breach their 
contract with the R.T. Nielson Co. as modified by failing 
to pay the R.T. Nielson Co. as agreed and/or violating 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
Answer: Yes. 
[R1941-1942] 
B. FACTS RELEVANT TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ISSUES. 
In addition to the foregoing facts, the following facts are 
relevant to the attorney's fees issues on appeal: 
7. The written Services Agreement at paragraph 14 contained 
the following provision regarding attorney's fees: 
Attorneys Fees. The prevailing party to any litigation 
brought to enforce any provision of this Agreement shall 
be awarded its costs and attorneys fees. 
Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, |^ 14. 
8. In contrast to RTNC's breach of contract claim based on 
an oral modification to the Services Agreement, Cook's contract 
claim was for breach of the provisions of the Services Agreement. 
The jury's Special Verdict on Cook's breach of contract claim was 
as follows: 
16. Did the RTNC breach the Services Agreement as 
alleged by [Cook], including the breach of covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing? 
Answer: Yes. 
[R1946] 
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9. Following the jury's verdict under which Cook was the 
only party to prevail on a claim to enforce the Services Agreement, 
Cook moved for an award of its attorney's fees pursuant to the 
jury's finding that RTNC had breached that written agreement. 
[R2038-2040] 
10. RTNC also moved for an award of its attorney's fees even 
though there was no finding that Cook breached the terms of the 
written Services Agreement. 
11. On May 15, 2000 the trial court denied Cook's Motion for 
an Award of Attorney's Fees and indicated that RTNC was the "only 
party who may be entitled to an award of fees and costs in this 
matter." [R2191-2193] 
12. RTNC filed an Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs 
seeking an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $210,290.00. 
[R2071-2077] Cook objected to RTNC's Affidavit of Attorneys Fees 
on the following bases: a) There was no breach by Cook of the 
written agreement or any covenant to which the attorney's fees 
agreement attached; b) the claim did not include any supporting 
documentation (such as contemporaneous billing entries or records) 
or any detail of the work and time spent on this matter; c) the 
claim did not set forth any evidence that the claimed fees were 
incurred by or were an obligation of RTNC; and d) the claim did 
not segregate the fees incurred between compensable and non-
compensable claims. [See id.; R2232-2242] 
13. The trial court sustained Cook's objection by noting that 
RTNC's counsel: 1) failed to itemize specific work performed and 
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the time spent in each aspect of the work by each individual; and 
2) failed to segregate fees incurred on compensable versus non-
compensable claims. [R2356-2360] The trial court ignored Cook's 
objection that there was no evidence that attorney's fees had been 
incurred.3 The trial court then gave counsel for RTNC an 
additional thirty (30) days and another opportunity to substantiate 
its claim for attorney's fees. [R2356-2360] 
14. On September 5, 2000 RTNC's counsel filed a Supplemental 
Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs. The Supplemental Affidavit 
again failed to include any contemporaneous supporting 
documentation or any evidence that the fees were incurred or were 
the obligation of RTNC. [R2381-2408] 
15. This Supplemental Affidavit was again objected to by 
Cook4 on the following bases: 1) There was no evidence that RTNC 
incurred or were responsible for the nearly $200,000 in fees being 
claimed; 2) There was no contemporaneous billing documentation 
submitted which made the determination of the reasonableness and 
necessity of the claimed fees impossible; 3) There was no 
contemporaneous billing documentation submitted which made the 
3
 To this day, and despite the issue being squarely raised 
several times by Cook before the award of fees, there is no 
evidence to suggest that RTNC actually incurred or was responsible 
for payment of any fees. For all that we know, this lawsuit was 
funded by a political opponent of Mr. Cook at a time when his 
congressional seat was being targeted both from within and without 
his party. 
4
 The Objection was filed by Cook on October 5, 2000 as 
Cook had obtained from the court an enlargement of time for filing 
the response after RTNC's counsel refused to agree to the 
enlargement of time. [R2447-2449] 
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allocation of fees between compensable and non-compensable claims 
impossible; 4) The purported allocation of fees between 
compensable and non-compensable claims was improper; and 5) There 
was no evidence from which a determination could be made that the 
attorney's and non-attorney's billing rates were consistent with 
the rates customarily charged in the locale for similar services. 
[R2450-2460] 
16. With respect to the reasonableness and necessity of the 
claimed fees, the only evidence submitted by RTNC's counsel was two 
(2) nearly identical statements to the effect that all of the work 
performed "was reasonable, appropriate, and necessary for the 
proper representation of [RTNC] according to the standards and 
practices of similarly situated and qualified attorneys in this 
area." [R2073, 2394] 
17. Despite these deficiencies, the trial court awarded RTNC 
attorney's fees in the sum of $195,800.93. [R2481-2483] Despite 
Cook's request, the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing 
or even oral argument. [R2232-2242] 
18. On December 20, 2000 the trial court entered Judgment in 
favor of RTNC and against Cook in the principal amount of 
$174,471.00 for the breach of the orally modified contract and 
unjust enrichment claims (after offsetting award to Cook), and 
$195,800.93 for attorney's fees. Cook filed the Notice of Appeal 
on January 5, 2 001. 
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V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. RTNC'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF ORALLY MODIFIED AGREEMENT. 
The trial court erred in entering Judgment in favor of RTNC 
for its purported claim for breach of the orally modified Services 
Agreement when, by its express terms, that Agreement could not be 
orally modified. Under Utah law, the parties1 Services Agreement 
could only be modified in a writing signed by the party intended to 
be bound. It is undisputed that no such written modification 
occurred and the court erred in not interpreting the contract and 
determining, as a matter of law, that there was no modification of 
the Agreement. Moreover, given that there was no finding (and the 
jury was not asked) whether the parties entered into any additional 
agreement, RTNCfs sole breach of contract claim which was for 
breach of the oral modification cannot stand; therefore, the trial 
court's Judgment in favor of RTNC on this claim must be reversed. 
2. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RTNC. 
The trial court erred on numerous grounds in awarding to RTNC 
$195,800.93 in claimed attorney's fees purportedly pursuant to the 
terms of the written Services Agreement. First, such award was 
improper as RTNC did not prove a breach of any provision of the 
Services Agreement so the pertinent contractual provision did not 
even apply. Second, there was no evidence or finding that the 
parties intended the pertinent attorney's fees provision to apply 
to a breach of an oral modification to the Services Agreement. 
Third, the substantial fee award was improper as there was no 
evidence or finding that RTNC actually paid, incurred or was 
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obligated to pay any attorney's fees in this action. The 
attorney's fees provision of the parties' Services Agreement only 
provides that a party be "awarded its costs and attorneys fees." 
Absent a showing by RTNC of the amount of "its costs and attorneys 
fees" (i.e., what it incurred), the award was improper. 
Fourth, RTNC's failure to provide any contemporaneous 
documentation or detailed itemization of the work and time in 
support of its claim for substantial fees precluded the trial court 
from exercising its legally mandated duty to only award fees which 
were reasonably and necessarily incurred. Instead, RTNC only 
provided a summary created after-the-fact which failed to identify 
dates on which services were performed, and simply assigned generic 
descriptions to the work performed. This information is simply 
insufficient to determine whether these fees were reasonable and 
necessary. 
Finally, these same deficiencies made it impossible for the 
trial court to determine which fees were properly attributable to 
the purportedly compensable claim (i.e., RTNC's breach of oral 
modification claim) versus the non-compensable claims (i.e., all 
others). Thus, each of these foregoing bases require that the 
trial court's award of fees to RTNC be reversed. 
3. TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO AWARD COOK ITS FEES AND COSTS 
As a final matter, the trial court erred in refusing to award 
Cook its fees and costs despite the undisputed fact that Cook was 
the only party to prevail on a claim for breach of the parties' 
written Services Agreement. The jury expressly found that RTNC had 
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breached the actual, written provisions of the Services Agreement; 
therefore, Cook was entitled to an award of its attorney's fees and 
costs as a matter of law and the trial court should be directed to 
make such an award. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
1. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT AGAINST 
COOK BASED SOLELY ON AN ORAL MODIFICATION OF THE PARTIES' 
WRITTEN AGREEMENT CONTAINING AN EXPRESS PROVISION 
REQUIRING ALL MODIFICATIONS TO BE IN WRITING. 
A judgment based upon a cause of action that does not exist 
cannot be upheld. In this case, two very sophisticated parties 
entered into this agreement. Moreover, this was not just any 
contract. These parties were contracting with regard to a race for 
the United States Congress. Appellee RTNC, the party who drafted 
the Services Agreement, included a clause which was agreed to by 
Cook that "no change or modification of this Agreement shall be 
valid or binding unless it is in writing and signed by the party 
intended to be bound." Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, H 15. Mr. 
Nielson admitted at trial that no attempt had been made to modify 
this Agreement in writing as the parties had agreed. In spite of 
his contractual promise, Mr. Nielson sought to have the jury answer 
the question whether this written Services Agreement, which in his 
own words could not be modified orally, had been orally modified. 
In Utah, we respect a party's right to contract. There simply 
is not (nor should there be) a cause of action for breach of an 
oral modification to a contract when sophisticated parties have 
agreed the contract cannot be orally modified. By submitting the 
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wrong question to the jury, RTNC obtained a judgment for what is 
not a cause of action; therefore, the Judgment cannot stand. 
A. INTERPRETATION OF A CONTRACT IS A QUESTION OF LAW 
FOR THE COURT, NOT A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY. 
THIS COURT GIVES NO DEFERENCE TO THE TRIAL COURT ON 
THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT. 
Not only is the ability of sophisticated parties to freely 
contract essential to a robust economy, but freedom of parties to 
contract is fundamental to our institutions of democracy. Indeed, 
freedom to contract is protected in both our federal Constitution 
and the Utah State Constitution. See U.S. Const., Article 1 § 10; 
Utah Const., Article 1 § 18. Like considerations have led to 
doctrines developed by the courts of this state that protect the 
parties in their freely contracted-for expectations. For instance, 
the courts of this state will not rewrite a contract between 
competent adults even though the contract turns out to disadvantage 
one of them, Dalton v. Jerico Const. Co., 642 P.2d 748 (Utah 1982), 
and the courts of this state do not use loose interpretive 
doctrines such as the implied covenant of good faith to materially 
alter the contracting parties1 expectations. Rio Alaom Corp. v. 
Jimco, Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 (Utah 1980). 
Interpretation of the contract and determination of the 
parties1 contractual expectations is a question of law to be 
determined by the court, not a question of fact to be submitted to 
the jury. E.g., Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 
803, 806 (Utah 1979). Since contract interpretation is a question 
of law, this Court does not give deference to the trial court's 
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findings regarding the contract's interpretation and the 
expectations of the parties under the contract they signed. id. 
In this case, RTNC drafted the written Services Agreement 
entered into by these parties and included therein paragraph 15 
which states that the contract can only be modified by a writing 
signed by the party intended to be bound. At trial Mr. Nielson, 
while freely acknowledging that he did not comply with that 
provision, sought and received a jury determination that the 
written contract was modified without the required writing he 
himself had made a material part of the parties1 expectation. It 
would send the wrong signal to our economy and social institutions 
if this Court were to hold that such freely contracted-for 
protections can be so lightly ignored. 
B. AS A MATTER OF LAW THE WRITTEN SERVICES AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN THESE PARTIES CANNOT BE MODIFIED EXCEPT IN 
WRITING SIGNED BY THE PARTY INTENDED TO BE BOUND. 
On March 5, 1996 Cook entered into the written Services 
Agreement with RTNC for the purpose of fund raising, polling, 
advertising, and "general consulting" concerning Mr. Cook's 1996 
campaign for election to Congress. 
In particular, RTNC agreed that: 
In accepting retainment by Client, Nielson shall 
undertake and assume the responsibility of performing for 
and on behalf of Client all duties and responsibilities 
which are reasonably necessary to fulfill the purposes of 
this Agreement as set forth above. 
In particular, Nielson shall oversee all general 
consulting for the campaign. This shall include campaign 
planning and strategy, convention management, delegate 
stacking and targeting, and other duties involved with 
general consulting. Nielson shall be required to oversee 
and administer all PAC fund raising activities. In 
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addition Nielson shall provide polling, and .advertising 
as required and needed by Client. 
Client further covenants and agrees that Nielson is 
entitled to oversee and conduct all PAC fund raising, 
consulting, polling and advertising and that Client will 
not conduct any of these activities without first 
consulting with Nielson and will not in any way interfere 
with Nielson1s efforts. 
Nielson shall receive 15% of the gross amount of all PAC 
monies received, regardless of the source. This agreement to 
perform PAC fund raising shall extend for a period of four 
months after the general election date. 
(b) G€*neral Consulting. Nielson shall receive the sum of 
$40,000 for consulting services through May 4, 1996. After 
May 4, 1996 and during the periods of the primary and general 
elections Nielson shall receive $4,000 a month for general 
consulting. . . . 
Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, UK 2,3 & 4. 
Mr. Nielson was well paid for his work. By Mr. Nielson's own 
admission, Cook paid RTNC approximately $230,000.00, [Trial 
Transcript, Day 3, pp. 87-88], including $19,521 that the jury 
found was improperly billed by Mr. Nielson. Thus, the written 
Services Agreement was very broad in scope covering the entire 1996 
election. 
While the parties agreed that: 
Additional services and fees may be negotiated and agreed 
to at a later date. Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, 
11 4. (b), 
they also agreed that: 
. . . No change or modification of this Agreement shall 
be valid or binding unless it is in writing and signed by 
the party intended to be bound. Services Agreement U 15. 
Thus, while this contract could allow proof of a new contract 
between the parties, it cannot be interpreted to allow an oral 
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modification of this contract. Utah law requires this proper 
interpretation. 
Under Utah law, the parties to a written contract that 
contains a clause requiring modifications to be in writing may 
modify the terms of their relationship through a new and subsequent 
oral agreement. See, e.g. , Davis v. Payne & D, Inc., 348 P. 2d 337, 
33 9 (Utah 1960) . The courts do not, however, ignore the contract 
language and permit an oral contract modification where the parties 
themselves have agreed that any contract modification must be in 
writing. To do so would violate the well established 
constitutional freedom to contract that our courts have been 
diligent to protect. See, e.g., Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott 
Co. , 603 P. 2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979) (a court will not rewrite an 
unambiguous contract) . 
As was pointed out in Davis, supra, a new oral contract can be 
proved without violence to the original contract's prohibition 
against oral modifications to that contract. In Davis the parties 
had agreed on specific amounts of materials needed on a jobsite and 
the prices to be paid. They also agreed, as in this case, that 
alterations to the contract needed to be made in writing. As the 
job progressed it appeared more materials would be needed and they 
were ordered. The Court held that: 
Appellant filled these orders and it is for the value of 
these materials for which this suit was brought. No 
claims are made for any materials furnished under the 
written contracts. 
Davis, 348 P.2d at 339 (emphasis added). 
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The Court explained its reasoning in allowing recovery under 
the oral agreement even though the written agreement could only be 
modified in writing: 
The facts are similar to those in Salzmer v. Jos. J. 
Snell Estate Corp., wherein this court held that 
requirement in a written agreement that no alteration 
should be made in the written order of the architect 
containing the amount to be paid for such alteration did 
not preclude recovery for alterations made on new plans 
and specifications not contemplated in the original 
agreement, although the alterations were on the same 
building which was the subject of the written agreement, 
because the parties actually entered into a new agreement 
and the defendant was therefore liable for the work and 
materials it received from the plaintiff in that action. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Thus, under Utah law a contract provision that modifications 
must be in writing will be enforced, even though enforcement of 
that provision does not preclude finding of a new oral contract on 
the same subject matter. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-209 (A signed 
agreement that excludes modification or recision except by a signed 
writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded.) Under Utah law 
the parties are protected in their expectations by the requirement 
that the new oral contract meet all the proof requirements of a 
valid contract including a meeting of the minds, see Provo City v. 
Nielson Scott Co. , 603 P. 2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979) , and including the 
giving of a valid consideration, Nordfors v. Knight, 60 P.2d 1115 
(Utah 1936) . There was no such finding in this case, however, and 
the court's Judgment in this respect must be reversed. 
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C. IT WAS UNDISPUTED THAT THE WRITTEN SERVICES 
AGREEMENT WAS NOT MODIFIED BY ANY WRITING SIGNED BY 
THE PARTY INTENDED TO BE BOUND. 
In its Complaint RTNC alleged the written Services Agreement 
between the parties and a series of oral contracts concluding that 
"all told, Cook has failed and refused to pay Nielson some $193,000 
due under the parties1 contracts . . . ." [R5] (Emphasis added). 
Up to and during trial RTNC pursued both its claims for breach 
of the written contract, which it claimed was orally modified, and 
claims for breach of what it termed independent oral contracts. 
[R8] 
In the trial Mr. Nielson frankly admitted there were no 
written modifications to the Services Agreement: 
Q. Would you turn back to Exhibit 17 [the Services 
Agreement] , please. Turn to the last page of Exhibit 17. 
Look at paragraph 15. 
Are you familiar with that paragraph? 
A. Yes, I've read through it. 
Q. Okay. Now the essence of that paragraph says that the 
only modifications to this agreement that are allowed are 
those that are in writing, correct? 
A. That's what it says. 
Q. Signed by the parties? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now, you didn't do that here, did you? 
A. No, we did not. 
Trial Transcript, Day 2, p. 165. 
After trial RTNC chose to submit to the jury only its claim 
for breach of the oral modification of the written contract and 
withdrew its claim for breach of the independent oral contracts. 
21 
Thus, there was never a claim and no evidence that the written 
Services Agreement had been properly modified by a writing signed 
by the party intended to be bound as required by paragraph 15 of 
that Agreement. 
D. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO SUBMIT TO THE 
JURY THE LEGAL QUESTION WHETHER THE SERVICES 
AGREEMENT WAS MODIFIED. 
Notwithstanding the very clear language of paragraph 15 of the 
Services Agreement providing that the Agreement could only be 
modified in a writing signed by the party intended to be bound, and 
the equally clear record that no such writing existed or was ever 
executed, the trial court nevertheless asked the jury: 
1. Did the RTNC and Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook 
for Congress Committee modify their Services Agreement as 
alleged by the R. T. Nielson Co.? [R1941-1942] 
Submission of this question to the jury was error. See, e.g. , 
Gouah v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1973) (where 
undisputed facts left only legal question it is error to submit 
issue to jury and juryfs erroneous answer to question should be 
ignored); see also Wirtz v. LaFitte, 326 F.2d 856, 859 (5th Cir. 
1964) (same). 
E. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE IGNORED THE JURY'S 
ERRONEOUS FINDING ON THE LEGAL QUESTION OF WHETHER 
THE WRITTEN SERVICES AGREEMENT WAS MODIFIED AND 
THIS COURT NEED GIVE NO DEFERENCE TO THAT ERRONEOUS 
FINDING. 
When the trial court has submitted a legal question to the 
jury, it is immaterial what the jury answered. Green Tree 
Acceptance, Inc. v. Wheeler, 832 F.2d 116, 118 (8th Cir. 1987). 
The jury's erroneous answer to the legal question submitted to it 
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must be ignored. Gough v. Rossmoof Corp., 487 F.2d 373, 377 (9th 
Cir. 1973) . It follows that this Court should also ignore the 
jury's erroneous finding on this question of law and give this 
contract a proper legal interpretation. See Provo City Corp. v. 
Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979) (no deference 
given to trial court's legal interpretation of contract). 
Since legally this contract could only be modified in writing, 
signed by the party intended to be bound, no judgment could 
properly be entered on the jury's erroneous finding. 
In many cases the distinction between a new oral contract and 
an oral modification of an existing contract may not make a 
difference, but in this case the distinction has two significant 
consequences. First, the jury did not answer the valid question, 
namely whether there were oral agreements between these parties. 
Second, as more fully discussed below, the attorney's fees 
provision of the Services Agreement applies only to "litigation 
brought to enforce any provision of this Agreement. . .", not to 
oral modification of the agreement. Services Agreement, Exhibit 
17P, il 14 (emphasis added) . Thus, these portions of the Judgment 
should be reversed. 
F. THERE ARE NO FINDINGS BY THIS JURY ON THE VALID 
OUESTION 
AGREEMENT 
JUDGMENT 
OF WHETHER THESE PARTIES 
' OTHER THAN THE 
FOR RTNC FOR 
SERVICES 
BREACH OF 
ENTERED INTO 
AGREEMENT 
CONTRACT 
AND 
ANY 
THE 
CANNOT 
STAND. 
This jury was never asked whether the parties entered into a 
new oral contract, which of course would have required proof of all 
elements of a contract. RTNC had pleaded causes of action for new 
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oral agreements, but withdrew those claims. Thus, the jury was not 
asked the valid factual question whether these parties entered into 
any "subsequent agreements to their written Services Agreement" but 
instead were asked a question which, as a matter of law, was not a 
valid question given the proper legal interpretation of the written 
contract- Because legally this contract could only be modified by 
a writing signed by the party intended to be bound and there was no 
such writing, the jury's erroneous legal determination in answer to 
the question is immaterial to determining the proper outcome of 
this case and the judgment entered on the basis of that 
determination is void. See, e.g., State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 
(Utah 1993) (judgment cannot stand where defendant convicted of 
crime that does not exist in Utah) ; U.S. v. Brundage, .136 F.2d 206, 
209 (6th Cir. 1943) (where verdict does not make finding on 
material issue, it cannot support judgment). 
As a matter of law this contract cannot be interpreted to 
allow RTNC to claim an oral modification. Because the jury was not 
asked and did not find a new oral agreement between these parties, 
the judgment on RTNC's breach of oral modification to the contract 
cannot stand. There simply is not a cause of action in Utah for 
breach of an oral modification of a contract that precludes oral 
modification. 
Since the failure of the jury to make a finding on the 
critical question in this case results from RTNC's own calculated 
decision to remove that question from the jury's consideration, the 
case should not be remanded for new trial but should be reversed 
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with judgment entered in favor of Defendant on RTNC's claim, no 
cause of action. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RTNC BASED 
SOLELY ON BREACH OF THE ORAL MODIFICATION WAS IMPROPER AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
The award to RTNC of attorney's fees was improper as a matter 
of law because: (1) Cook did not breach the written agreement 
containing the attorney's fees provision, (2) the parties1 
agreement did not provide for an award of attorney's fees for 
breach of an oral obligation, and (3) attorney's fees are not 
recoverable when there is no evidence and there has been no jury 
finding that the parties agreed that attorney's fees would be paid 
on breach of an oral modification of the agreement. These are 
addressed in turn. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RTNC 
WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE RTNC DID NOT PROVE A BREACH OF 
THE WRITTEN SERVICES AGREEMENT OR ANY COVENANT TO 
WHICH THE ATTORNEY'S FEE AGREEMENT ATTACHED. 
The other important ramification of the legal conclusion that 
this contract cannot be orally modified, even though a new oral 
contract is not precluded, regards the award of attorney's fees. 
The written contract between these parties specifically provides: 
The prevailing party to any litigation brought to enforce 
any provision of this Agreement shall be awarded its 
costs and attorneys fees. 
Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, % 14 (emphasis added). 
This language, coupled with the agreement of the parties that this 
contract could not be modified except with a writing signed by the 
party intended to be bound, clearly evinced the parties' intention 
to limit recovery of attorney's fees to litigation regarding the 
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terms of the written agreement, not litigation over what someone 
might claim as an oral modification. As such, the trial court 
erred in awarding RTNC's attorney's fees based solely on its 
purported claim for breach of an oral modification. 
The public policy of the State also dictates this outcome. It 
is well established that Utah follows the "American Rule" when it 
comes to the award of attorney's fees. E.g., Stubbs v. Hemmert, 
567 P. 2d 168 (Utah 1977) . Under the American Rule, attorney's fees 
can be awarded only if there is an express statutory or contractual 
basis for the award. E.g. , Walker v. Sandwick, 548 P. 2d 1273 (Utah 
1976). In this case there is no statutory basis for recovery of 
fees. 
Moreover, when there is a contractual liability for fees, the 
contractual liability for payment of attorney's fees extends only 
to the amount necessary for the enforcement of the contractual 
provision breached. Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601, 604 (Utah 
1978) . 
Sound public policy prevents expansion of attorney's fees 
recovery beyond that which is expressly contracted for in writing. 
The public policy reason for the American Rule is to avoid 
restricting access to the courts to resolve disputes. Because of 
the uncertainty of litigation, persons with legitimate disputes 
would be discouraged from seeking judicial resolution if they run 
the risk of paying not only their own, but also their opponent's 
fees in the event they lose: 
The courts of this state are always open to all for the 
redress of grievances and the protection of legal rights, 
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and in our judgment they should refrain from allowing the 
imposition of costs and expenses upon the losing party 
except such as are provided for by statute and such as by 
the consensus of the opinions of the courts by long and 
uniform usage have been allowed in certain cases as 
necessary for the protection of legal rights. 
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 195 P. 305 (Utah 1921). 
In keeping with that general theme, not only must there be a 
statute or contractual provision allowing for imposition of fees, 
but even then fees are allowed only for the specific purpose 
authorized, and then only in amounts proven to be reasonable and 
necessary. E.g. , Walker v. Sandwick, 548 P. 2d 1273, 1274 (Utah 
1976). 
For example, in Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977), 
the plaintiff sued to foreclose a promissory note secured by a 
mortgage. The note contained a provision for recovery of fees and 
the plaintiff tried to recover fees for both the foreclosure and 
for defense of the counterclaim. The court allowed fees for the 
foreclosure but not for negotiation and defense of the 
counterclaim. 
Likewise, in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 195 P. 305, 
307-312 (Utah 1921), the statute allowed for recovery of fees for 
an action to remove a wrongful attachment. In that case the court 
limited the award "to fees for services in connection with the 
attachment itself, and no allowance can be made for services in 
defending the principal action, in the absence of a stipulation 
therefore in the bond sued on. . . . " St. Joseph, 195 P. at 307-
312. 
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In this case the contractual* provision on which the trial 
court relied expressly and exclusively covered "this contract", not 
"an oral modification of this contract" which the contract 
expressly precluded. Therefore, sound public policy and harmony 
with prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court requires this Court 
to "refrain from allowing the imposition of attorney fees." Id.5 
As such, the award of fees to RTNC must be reversed. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RTNC 
WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE UTAH LAW DOES NOT ALLOW 
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR BREACH OF AN ORAL OBLIGATION. 
Utah statutory law requires that the contractual provision 
that permits a court to impose attorney's fees on the losing party 
must be in writing. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (2000) . Utah Code 
section 78-27-56.5 specifically limits the recovery of fees to 
those instances where the contractual provision is in a "promissory 
note, written contract, or other writing. . . . " Id. 
In a caise strikingly similar to the present action, Petersen 
v. Hodges, 239 P.2d 180 (Utah 1951), this Court ruled that a party 
is only entitled to attorney's fees under an attorney's fee's 
provision of a written contract when the claimed breach 
necessitating or giving rise to the attorney's fees is based upon 
the terms of the written agreement, not on an oral adjunct to the 
written agreement. Icl. at 183. 
5
 Where, as here, the parties were entering into a written 
agreement with the understanding that it could not be modified 
except in writing, they certainly did not contemplate that one 
could recover attorney's fees for asserting such an illegal 
modification! 
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In this case t-here was no finding that Cook breached the 
written agreement or any of its terms. To the contrary, the jury 
found it was RTNC who breached the written contract. As Petersen 
instructs and other Utah cases caution, the contractual right to 
recover attorney's fees cannot be stretched to cover breach of an 
oral modification the contract itself precludes. Thus, the trial 
court erred as a matter of law in awarding attorney's fees to RTNC 
and that portion of the Judgment should be reversed. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RTNC 
WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE THERE WAS NO FINDING THAT THE 
PARTIES AGREED THAT ATTORNEY'S FEES WOULD BE PAID 
ON BREACH OF THE ORAL MODIFICATION. 
Even if Utah allowed recovery of fees based on an oral 
agreement, RTNC did not prove that this oral agreement carried with 
it the agreement that damages for breach would include recovery of 
attorney's fees. 
There was absolutely no evidence (nor any finding by the jury) 
that the parties agreed, when entering into any oral agreements, 
that the attorney's fees provision of the written contract would 
apply to these new contracts. Having failed in this proof, RTNC 
cannot recover attorney's fees. 
The case of Kidman v. White, 378 P.2d 898 (Utah 1963) is 
instructive on this point. In Kidman, the defendant had assumed 
"in full" plaintiff's obligation under a contract. Id. at 899. 
The contract assumed contained an attorney's fees clause and the 
trial court had entered summary judgment against defendant imposing 
attorney's fees. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court 
and held that plaintiff had the burden of proving that defendant in 
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fact assumed the obligation to pay attorney's fees. Id. at 899. 
The case was remanded to the trial court for a trial on the issue 
of whether plaintiff could meet its burden to show that in the 
later agreement defendant had assumed the liability for attorney's 
fees of the prior agreement. Ld. at 898-899. 
In this case the jury has spoken. It did not find a breach by 
Cook of the written Services Agreement containing the attorney's 
fees clause. There was no finding by the jury and indeed there was 
no evidence that when the parties entered into the oral 
modification they agreed that attorney's fees were recoverable in 
an action for breach of that oral modification. 
Nor would the evidence have supported such a finding. The 
contractual provision states in its entirety: 
The prevailing party to any litigation brought to enforce 
any provision of this Agreement shall be awarded its 
costs and attorney fees." 
Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, ^ 14. 
Significantly, the terms used in this provision do not apply to 
"the provisions of this agreement and any oral modification 
hereof." In fact, the parties contemplated that any extension of 
the provisions of this contract would require a writing signed by 
both parties (which did not occur). See Services Agreement, 
Exhibit 17P at % 15. While such a clause does not prevent the 
parties from altering their relationships through subsequent oral 
agreement, it prevents extension of the written contact's 
provisions to oral covenants, at least in the absence of a specific 
writing, proof or finding that such was the meeting of the minds. 
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Thus, there is no factual basis upon which an award of attorney's 
fees can be made in favor of RTNC. RTNC having failed in this 
proof cannot recover attorney's fees. Kidman, 378 P. 2d at 899-
900. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING NEARLY $200,000 IN 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RTNC. 
Even assuming an award of attorney's fees was allowed for 
breach of an oral modification, there are numerous independent 
grounds upon which the trial court erred in awarding fees to RTNC. 
The award of $195,800.93 for attorney1s fees was based solely on 
the two (2) affidavits submitted to the trial court. [R2071-2077 
8c 2381-2408] No evidentiary hearing or oral argument was held 
even though the award of fees to RTNC exceeded its recovery on its 
claims tried to a jury for ten (10) days.6 With respect to the 
affidavits which were submitted, the first affidavit from RTNC's 
counsel merely attached a one-page list of the total hours and fees 
claimed to have been spent on this matter. [R2076] Cook properly 
objected as RTNC had failed to show the amount, if any, of the fees 
actually incurred by RTNC, and whether those fees were reasonable 
and necessary. 
More specifically, Cook raised the issue of whether the amount 
of fees RTNC was obligated to pay to its counsel was limited by a 
contingency fee arrangement. The trial court then allowed RTNC to 
file supplemental materials to support its claim. In response, 
RTNC filed its Supplemental Affidavit which completely ignored the 
6
 Cook requested oral argument on the attorney's fees 
issue, but the request was denied by the trial court. [R2232-2242] 
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issue by failing to indicate anywhere that RTNC was liable for 
(i.e., incurred) any portion of the $233,326.00 in fees RTNC's 
counsel was claiming. Moreover, RTNC still failed to provide to 
the court (or opposing counsel) a single, contemporaneous document 
or billing statement itemizing the date and work performed for the 
items it sought to recover. Instead, RTNC!s counsel spent in 
excess of $11,000.00 (which amount was charged to Cook) creating 
another after-the-fact summary of the work purportedly performed 
which failed to indicate the dates the services were performed and 
time spent on those dates, or any detailed or contemporaneous 
description of the work performed. RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit, 
which was its second attempt to support its claim for attorneyfs 
fees, was thus fatally deficient under Utah law because: (1) It 
contained no evidence that the attorney's fees, if any, were 
actually incurred by or an obligation of RTNC (i.e. , that RTNC paid 
or is liable to pay any of the fees); (2) It failed to provide 
any contemporaneous documentation or other information from which 
Cook or the court could determine whether the fees claimed were 
reasonable and necessary; (3) It failed to provide any 
contemporaneous documentation or evidence to allow a proper 
allocation of the claimed fees between compensable versus non-
compensable claims; and (4) It failed to provide sufficient 
evidence to determine if the attorneys' billing rates (and the 
rates charged for non-attorneys) were consistent with the rates 
customarily charged in the locality for similar services. Thus, 
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RTNC's request for fees was legally insufficient on each of these 
independent grounds and no fees should have been awarded. 
A, THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RTNC 
WAS IMPROPER AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THERE WAS 
NO EVIDENCE NOR ANY FINDING THAT RTNC INCURRED ANY 
FEES.7 
The provision of the Services Agreement which provides for an 
award of attorney's fees states as follows: 
14. Attorneys Fees. The prevailing party to any litigation 
brought to enforce any provision of this Agreement shall be 
awarded its costs and attorneys fees. 
Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, % 14 (emphasis added). 
The basic purpose of, and public policy behind, this type of 
provision is as a cost-shifting mechanism whereby the non-breaching 
party is made whole by having "its costs and attorneys fees" 
reimbursed by the breaching party. As this Court recently 
explained, there is a "public policy that the basic purpose of 
attorney's fees is to indemnify the prevailing party and not to 
punish the losing party by allowing the winner a windfall profit." 
Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 1 P.3d 1095, 1106-1108 
(Utah 2000)(award of fees limited to amount actually paid or for 
which party is obligated) (citing Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1375 (Utah 1996) (no award of fees where 
party seeking fees did not actually pay or become liable for legal 
representation and thus did not incur attorney's fees)); Smith v. 
7
 This issue of whether it was proper to award attorney's 
fees claimed by RTNC without evidence or a finding they were 
incurred, owed, or the responsibility of RTNC is a question of law 
which is reviewed for correctness. E.g., Selvage v. J.J. Johnson 
& Assoc1 s, 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (UtahApp. 1996) (citing Robertson v. 
Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499 (UtahApp. 1992)). 
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Batchelor, 823 P.2d 467, 473 (Utah 1992)-(same) . Thus, an award of 
fees is allowed only where the party claiming fees actually pays or 
becomes obligated to pay. 
RTNC failed to provide any evidence that it paid any of the 
nearly $200,000 in fees it was awarded, or that it was obligated in 
any way for the payment of those fees. Nor did the trial court 
make such a finding. Accordingly, the award of fees must be 
reversed. 
RTNCfs failure to provide any evidence it incurred or is 
obligated for payment of any portion of the nearly $200,000.00 in 
fees is even more curious because Cook specifically raised the 
issue in response to RTNC's first application for fees which the 
Court found deficient,8 and in response to RTNC's second fee 
application as well. RTNC's repeated failure to respond to this 
issue speaks volumes. It is very possible in this case that RTNC's 
representation against Cook was done as a political favor or paid 
for by some third-party with political interests divergent from 
Cook. In any event, if RTNC were responsible for these fees, RTNC 
could easily have provided evidence to that effect to the court. 
Moreover, the fact that there was not a single, contemporaneous 
8
 In that pleading, Cook indicated that they believed there 
was a contingent fee arrangement between RTNC and its counsel. As 
such, the recovery of the fee would be limited to the amount of the 
contingency set forth in that agreement. See Softsolutions, Inc. , 
1 P.3d at 1106-1108; Jones, Waldo, 923 P.2d at 1375; Batchelor, 
823 P.2d at 473. RTNC has chosen not to provide this Court with 
any evidence the nearly $200,000 in fees are obligations of RTNC 
(i.e., "its attorneys fees and costs") as required under the 
Services Agreement, and the lack of that evidence is fatal to its 
claim for fees. 
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billing statement or record further evinces that RTNC was not 
billed for and, therefore, did not incur the fees sought. RTNC has 
completely failed to meet its burden of establishing that any of 
the fees claimed were actually incurred or are an obligation of 
RTNC. The award of fees to RTNC, therefore, should be reversed. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF NEARLY $200,000 IN 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RTNC WAS IMPROPER AS RTNC FAILED 
TO ESTABLISH THAT THE FEES WERE REASONABLE AND 
NECESSARY, OR THAT THEY PERTAINED TO A COMPENSABLE 
CLAIM. 
Even assuming that RTNC was allowed to recover its fees under 
the Services Agreement and there was evidence that RTNC had 
incurred or become liable for those fees, RTNC has failed to meet 
its burden of establishing that the $195,800.93 in fees were 
reasonable and necessary, or that the fees pertained to compensable 
claims. 
Under Utah law, the party claiming entitlement to attorney's 
fees has the burden of establishing that the fees claimed were both 
reasonably and necessarily incurred. E.g., Brown v. Richards, 840 
P.2d 143, 155 (Utah App. 1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 978 
P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1999). Absent an itemization of the work 
performed and the time spent, the trial court could not exercise 
its legally mandated duty to "disallow claims for excessive, 
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary charges." Brown, 978 P.2d at 
476; see also Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601, 603-604 (Utah 
1978)(no fee recovery where party "failed in his burden of proof 
with regard to the amount of time necessarily spent for that 
purpose"); Richard Barton Enters., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 
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380-381 (Utah 1996) (must prove that each of the fees and costs they 
assert were incurred were both reasonable and necessary). 
1) RTNC's Failure To Properly Support Its Claims For 
Fees Prevented The Trial Court From Finding That 
The Fees Claimed Were Reasonable And Necessary. 
With respect to the reasonableness and necessity of the 
claimed fees, the only evidence submitted by RTNC's counsel was two 
(2) nearly identical statements to the effect that all of the work 
performed "was reasonable, appropriate, and necessary for the 
proper representation of [RTNC] according to the standards and 
practices of similarly situated and qualified attorneys in this 
area." [R2073, 2394] Moreover, RTNC's two (2) Applications for 
Fees wholly failed to include any contemporaneous documentation 
such as billing statements, invoices, time records or the like. 
Instead, RTNCfs counsel spent more than $11,000.00 creating an 
after-the-fact summary which failed to identify dates on which 
services were performed, and assigned generic descriptions to work 
performed. This summary made it impossible for the trial court and 
opposing counsel, and for this Court on appeal, to determine 
whether the fees were reasonable and whether they were necessary 
for the purpose for which they were performed.9 For instance,10 
9
 The mere fact that RTNC sought to and did recover from 
Cook the more than $11,000.00 in fees for creating this summary 
when it could (and should) have simply attached the billing records 
establishes the unreasonableness of RTNC's claim. 
10
 This section simply examines some of the examples where 
the evidence clearly fails to allow a determination of 
reasonableness and necessity. This list certainly is not 
exhaustive and, more importantly, could not be exhaustive because 
the lack of underlying documentation makes it impossible to do so. 
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the summary indicates that there were 74.3 hours spent to 
"Draft/edit pleadings re motions for protective orders and/or to 
compel." [R2400] Absent the dates of the work performed, however, 
it is impossible to tie this into any particular work performed, or 
determine what resulted from these 74.3 hours and whether it was 
reasonable and necessary. As another example, the summary 
indicates nearly 60 hours spent preparing for and participating in 
the Felt mediation. [R2402] Again, without seeing the particular, 
contemporaneous time entries (including date and description) there 
simply is no way to determine whether such charges were reasonable 
or necessary. 
Instead, this Court is being asked, just as the trial court 
was asked and agreed, to blindly rely on the generic descriptions 
and amounts of time assigned by RTNC's counsel years after the 
fact. That simply is not allowed under Utah law. Particularly 
where RTNC's counsel is asking this Court to affirm an award of 
nearly $200,000.00 in attorney's fees, more than was recovered in 
this case. In sum, RTNC failed to properly support the 
reasonableness and necessity of its requested attorney's fees and 
the trial court's award of fees should be reversed. 
2) RTNC's Failure To Properly Support Its Claims For 
Fees Prevents This Court From Allocating The Fees 
Between Compensable And Non-Compensable Claims. 
RTNC's failure to provide contemporaneous billing records 
showing the dates, the specific descriptions of the work performed, 
and the time spent on a particular task also made it impossible for 
the trial court to determine what fees were properly attributable 
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to the compensable claim (i.e., RTNC's breach of orally modified 
contract claim)11 versus the non-compensable claims (i.e., all 
others). RTNC's insistence that the trial court simply rely on the 
after-the-fact summary RTNC created in its attempt to persuade the 
court to award nearly $200,000.00 in fees is improper. The 
sanitized, generic descriptions set forth by RTNC did not 
adequately describe the work performed such that it can be assigned 
to any particular issue. To make this determination there simply 
is no substitute for the description assigned to each item of work 
at the time the work was performed when there was no issue 
regarding whether the work pertained to a particular claim. 
In contrast to the summary relied on by RTNC, the Utah Court 
of Appeals in Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 978 P. 2d 470 (Utah 
App. 1999), affirmed an attorney's fee award where copies of all 
bills for legal work were attached to the fee application. Despite 
this obvious requirement and Cook's continued objection to RTNC's 
failure to provide this basic information, RTNC twice failed to 
provide this information to the trial court and its request for 
nearly $2 00,000.00 in attorney's fees should have been denied as a 
matter of law. 
In addition to failing to provide the requisite underlying 
information for the necessary determinations to be made, RTNC's 
summary itself appears to improperly allocate between compensable 
11
 Of course, as discussed above, it is Cook's position that 
none of the claims RTNC prevailed upon were compensable because the 
jury did not find that Cook breached the written Services 
Agreement. 
38 
and non-compensable claims in several respects.12 First, RTNC 
apparently included in claims it perceived as "compensable" Cook's 
breach of contract claim because RTNC "defeated most aspects" of 
that claim. RTNC then pronounced that it only found non-
compensable the "fees incurred in its defense of the two Cook 
counterclaims where RTNC was unsuccessful." [R2390] But there 
were nine (9) claims in this case altogether and RTNC prevailed on 
only one (1) for which the trial court determined attorney's fees 
to be properly recoverable. Thus, RTNC has failed to properly 
segregate the fees between compensable and non-compensable claims. 
Second, RTNC's allocation of non-compensable fees by 
particular categories do not make sense. For instance, while RTNC 
has allocated as non-compensable 76.8% of the mere $1,500 for the 
"Pleadings" aspect of the case, RTNC allocated as non-compensable 
zero percent of the more than $35,000 for the 
11
 Settlement/Mediations" , "Misc. Communications" , "Dispositive 
Motions", and "Pretrial Procedure" aspects of the case. In fact, 
other than with respect to "pleadings", the ratios of non-
compensable fees to compensable fees range between zero to 28.8%, 
with the amount allocated to non-compensable claims for five (5) 
different areas being less than 2% of the fees. These ratios are 
12
 Again, this section simply examines some of the examples 
where RTNC clearly failed to properly allocate its requested fees 
between compensable and non-compensable fees. This list certainly 
is not exhaustive and, more importantly, could not be exhaustive 
because the lack of the underlying documentation makes it 
impossible to do so. 
39 
simply arbitrary and include fees which clearly should be non-
compensable. 
3) The Trial Court's Award Of Attorney's Fees Was 
Improper As RTNC Has Failed To Provide Evidence 
That The Attorney's (And Non-Attorney's) Billing 
Rates Were Consistent With The Rates Customarily 
Charged In The Locality For Similar Services, 
Finally, RTNC fails to set forth any basis for the hourly 
rates set forth in its summary. There simply is no showing that 
the rates which range from $65.00 to $175.00 per hour are 
consistent with rates customarily charged in the locality for 
similar services. In fact, there is no discussion of any of the 
credentials, experience or other relevant factors for the 
individuals for which the amounts are charged. Other than the 
names of these individuals,13 there is no information from which 
the court could determine whether the hourly rates are consistent 
and proper as required under Utah law. This is simply another 
defect with the proof that was provided to support the claim of 
nearly $200,000.00 in attorney's fees. The award of fees should be 
reversed based solely on this lack of fundamental proof by RTNC. 
13
 Moreover, with respect to someone with the initials "PKN" 
there isn't even a name provided even though that person charges 
$175.00 per hour. Interestingly, there was no one with those 
initials identified on RTNC's first submission to the court wherein 
it was requesting $210,290.00 in fees. This type of inconsistency 
and lack of fundamental information further highlights RTNC's 
failure to meet its burden of proof, particularly given that it is 
seeking an amount of fees which exceeds its entire recovery in this 
case. 
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4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING COOK HIS ATTORNEY'.q 
FEES AND COSTS RESULTING FROM RTNC' S BREACH OF THE 
WRITTEN SERVICES AGREEMENT.14 
The written Services Agreement at paragraph 14 contained the 
following provision regarding attorney's fees: 
Attorneys Fees. The prevailing party to any litigation 
brought to enforce any provision of this Agreement shall 
be awarded its costs and attorneys fees. 
Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, K 14. 
In contrast to RTNC's breach of contract claim based on an oral 
modification to the Services Agreement, Cook's contract claim was 
for breach of the provisions of the Services Agreement. The jury's 
Special Verdict on Cook's breach of contract claim was as follows: 
16. Did [RTNC] breach the Services Agreement as alleged 
by [Cook] , including the breach of covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing? 
Answer: Yes. 
[R1946] 
Given that the jury found that Cook was the only party to prevail 
on a claim for breach of the written Services Agreement, it was 
error for the trial court not to give effect to paragraph 14 of the 
parties' Services Agreement and award Cook its fees incurred in 
enforcing the Agreement. Thus, the trial court's refusal to award 
Cook its attorney's fees should be reversed and the case remanded 
for a proper determination of the amount of fees to which Cook is 
entitled. 
14
 This issue of whether the court erred in failing to award 
attorney's fees to Cook is a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. E.g., Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc's, 910 P.2d 
1252, 1257 (Utah App. 1996) (citing Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 
P.2d 496, 499 (Utah App. 1992)). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Cook seeks the following 
relief: 
1) The trial court's Judgment awarding RTNC $162,962 plus 
interest on its claim for breach of the orally modified 
contract should be vacated with Judgment entered for Cook 
on RTNC's claim, no cause of action; 
2) The trial court's Judgment awarding RTNC $195,800.93 in 
attorney's fees should be vacated; and 
3) The trial court's refusal to award Cook his attorney's 
fees incurred in connection with his successful 
prosecution of his breach of contract claim and defense 
of RTNC's claim for breach of contract should be reversed 
and the case remanded to the trial court for a 
determination of the proper amount to be awarded to Cook. 
DATED this ZO-— day of February, 2001. 
ATKIN Sc LILJA, P.C. 
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Craig C. Cobum [A0688] 
Russell C. Fericks [A3793] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for R. T. Nielson Company 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801)531-2000 
Facsimile: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R. T. NIELSON COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MERRILL COOK, et al., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
Civil No. 970904869CV 
Hon. Sandra N. Peuler 
The Court, having reviewed and considered plaintiff's Supplemental Affidavit of 
Attorneys Fees and Costs, defendants' Objection to RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys 
Fees and Costs, and plaintiff's Reply to that Objection, makes the following findings of fact and 
reaches the following conclusions of law in support of its award of attorneys fees to plaintiff: 
HUHI 0ISTRICT COURT 
Third Ntrffoiaj District 
0 : . 2 0 2000 
Clerit 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This dispute arose out of services rendered and expenses incurred by plaintiff 
R.T. Nielson Co. ("RTNC") for or on behalf defendants Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for 
Congress Committee (collectively "Cook") during and following Cook's 1996 congressional 
campaign. 
2. In March 1996, RTNC and Cook entered into a written Services Agreement 
whereby, inter alia, RTNC agreed to provide services for Cook's 1996 congressional campaign and 
Cook agreed to pay for those services. The Services Agreement contains the contractual provision 
giving rise to RTNC's claim for attorneys fees. 
3. RTNC claimed that the parties twice orally modified the Services Agreement 
to expand and extend RTNC's services and that Cook failed to pay RTNC as agreed under the 
modified Services Agreement. Cook denied these claims. 
4. RTNC first brought suit against Cook in January 1997. Shortly thereafter, 
that suit was voluntarily dismissed by RTNC without prejudice and the parties engaged in direct 
negotiations and in a mediation in an effort to resolve their dispute. These efforts failed. 
5. RTNC refiled suit against Cook in July 1997, and Cook counterclaimed. 
RTNC's claims, which were plead in the alternative, included breach of contract, account stated, 
and quantum meruit. Cook's counterclaims, some of which were plead in the alternative, included 
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty against RTNC, and breach of 
fiduciary duty against RTNC's principal agent, Ronald T. Nielson. 
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6. Out of all of RTNC's and Cook's claims, only those alleging breach of the 
Services Agreement, if and as modified, were ostensibly compensable with regard to attorneys fees. 
7. The parties' respective claims were based upon the same facts. Specifically, 
they were based upon the services provided and expenses incurred by RTNC during and following 
Cook's 1996 congressional campaign and Cook's payment or failure to pay for those services and 
expenses. Similarly, the legal theories underlying the parties' claims were interrelated and most 
claims were plead in the alternative. 
8. The relevant time period for the parties' dispute was early 1996 through 
December 1996. For purposes of this discussion, this time period is comprised of two distinct 
components. The first time period ("the election phase"), ran from early 1996 through November 
5, 1996, the date of thel996 General Election and the date upon which the Services Agreement 
expired of its own accord. The second time period ("the post-election phase") ran from November 
6 through December, 1996. 
9. The bulk of RTNC's claims and of Cook's counterclaims arose out of the 
election phase. This phase encompassed at least 80% of the total relevant time period. Further, 
approximately $182,000 of RTNC's total claim of $194,000 (i.e., 94%) was for services rendered 
and expenses incurred during the election phase. A similar proportionality applies to Cook's 
counterclaims. 
10. There was, effectively, complete factual overlap as to the various claims 
each party asserted against the other. Specifically: 
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a. RTNC's alternative claims for election phase services and expenses {i.e., its 
compensable breach of contract claim and its noncompensable unjust enrichment 
and account stated claims) were based upon the same facts {e.g., conversations, 
services, expenses, invoices, payments, nonpayments, notes, and other evidence 
from the election phase). 
b. Cook's compensable breach of contract claim and his noncompensable 
claims regarding the election phase were based on these same facts. 
In short, the prosecution and defense of RTNC's and Cook's compensable and noncompensable 
election phase claims required proof of what transpired during the election phase. Similarly, 
RTNC's and Cook's claims related to the post-election phase (none of which were compensable) 
required proof of the same facts, albeit a different set of facts than the election phase claims. 
11. As more specifically itemized in RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of 
Attorneys Fees and Costs, this litigation included, inter alia, the following activities: 
a. Extensive written discovery undertaken by both RTNC and Cook; 
b. Multiple depositions, including several that lasted two or more days; 
c. Multiple discovery-related motions (with RTNC prevailing on the majority 
of these motions); 
d. Multiple dispositive motions (with RTNC prevailing on the majority of these 
motions); 
e. Multiple pretrial motions; 
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f. Jury selection which, due to media interest, entailed a greater effort by the 
parties (e.g., a jury questionnaire, in-chambers voir dire, larger jury pool); 
g. Ten (10) days of trial; and, 
h. Extensive post-trial proceedings, primarily with regard to attorneys fees. 
12. The vast majority of RTNC's litigation effort through trial was spent 
developing and presenting RTNC's claims for services rendered and expenses incurred during the 
election phase {i.e., its compensable breach of contract claim and its overlapping but 
noncompensable alternative unjust enrichment and other claims). 
13. RTNC spent a modest amount of time developing its unjust enrichment 
claim for post-election services and expenses. This claim was based on a simple legal principle and 
limited facts (i.e., a single invoice and limited testimony from a handful of witnesses). 
14. RTNC spent a modest amount of time prior to trial addressing Cook's 
claims. Several of these claims were dismissed on summary judgment before trial. These 
dismissals encompassed several elements of Cook's compensable breach of contract claim and his 
alternative unjust enrichment, fiduciary duty, and other noncompensable claims. 
15. Significant portions of both parties' litigation efforts were not claim-specific 
(e.g., discovery and evidentiary motions, credibility, procedural matters and motions). 
16. The case was tried to a jury in April 2000. The only claims tried to the jury 
were: (i) RTNC's claim that Cook breached the modified Services Agreement; (ii) RTNC's 
overlapping, alternative unjust enrichment claim for election phase services and expenses; (iii) 
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RTNC's unjust enrichment claim for post-election services and expenses; (iv) the remaining 
elements of Cook's claim that RTNC breached the Services Agreement; and, (v) Cook's unjust 
enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty claims against RTNC and Ronald Nielson. 
17. The jury found, inter alia, that: (i) RTNC and Cook had orally modified the 
Services Agreement as alleged by RTNC; (ii) Cook had breached the parties' modified contract by 
failing to pay RTNC as agreed; (iii) RTNC had overcharged Cook for certain expenses; (iv) RTNC 
was not entitled to a commission on funds contributed to Cook by political party committees; (iv) 
Cook had been unjustly enriched by the services provided and expenses incurred by RTNC during 
the post-election phase; and, (v) all of Cook's other counterclaims were without merit. Further, 
RTNC's overlapping, alternative unjust enrichment claim for election phase services and expenses 
was eliminated as a matter of law by the jury's finding that the Services Agreement had been 
modified by the parties to include said services and expenses. 
18. With the jury's verdict, RTNC prevailed on its compensable breach of 
contract claim and had successfully defended seven of the nine elements of Cook's compensable 
breach of contract claims. These seven elements encompassed the vast majority of damages or set-
offs sought by Cook. Further, having sought approximately $194,000 in total damages, RTNC 
received a net verdict in its favor of approximately $175,000, including some $163,000 for Cook's 
breach of the modified Services Agreement. 
19. Based upon the foregoing, this Court previously ruled that RTNC was the 
prevailing party under applicable law and that RTNC was entitled to recover reasonable attorneys 
fees from Cook for its successful prosecution or defense of compensable claims. 
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20. In its August 8, 2000, Minute Entry, this Court rejected RTNCs initial fee 
application and invited RTNC to supplement that application by: (i) itemizing the specific work 
performed and time spent in each aspect of the work by each individual employed by RTNCs 
counsel; and (ii) segregating this time and effort between compensable and noncompensable 
claims. 
21. RTNCs Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs, including 
specifically Exhibit 1 thereto, accomplished these objectives. Specifically, it: 
a. sets forth the legal basis for an award of attorneys fees; 
b. itemizes, identifies and describes the specific work actually performed by 
each member of RTNC s legal team; 
c. sets forth the number of hours spent by each member of RTNCs legal team 
in pursuing this matter; 
d. affirms that the hourly rates upon which RTNCs fee application is based 
and the total fee award sought are reasonable and customary for comparable legal 
services in this area; 
e. articulates a reasonable and rational basis for segregating and allocating 
RTNCs attorneys fees between compensable and noncompensable claims; and, 
f. reasonably segregates and allocates RTNCs attorneys fees between 
compensable and noncompensable claims. 
22. Cook offers no evidence refuting RTNCs Supplemental Affidavit of 
Attorneys Fees and Costs, including but not limited to RTNCs evidence of: (i) the nature, 
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reasonableness, and necessity of the work actually performed; (ii) the time expended by any 
member of RTNC s legal team on compensable and noncompensable claims; (iii) the factual 
overlap between compensable and noncompensable claims; (iv) the reasonableness of the fees 
sought; and (v) the consistency of the rates with those customarily charged for similar legal 
services in this area. 
23. Based upon RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs 
and the Court's personal familiarity with this complicated, high-profile, and hotly-contested 
litigation, the legal work performed by RTNC's counsel was reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute this matter. In this vein, it is noted that the time spent by RTNC's counsel through trial 
and the fees sought by RTNC are, as evidenced by Cook's own fee application, comparable to the 
hours and fees of Cook's counsel through trial. 
24. RTNC's reasonable attorneys fees through September 5, 2000, the date of 
RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs, were $233,326.00. 
25. Of this amount, $195,800.93 represents reasonable attorneys fees through 
said date for the successful prosecution of compensable claims in this matter, the successful 
defense of compensable counterclaims in this matter, and the successful prosecution or defense of 
noncompensable claims or counterclaims in this matter which overlapped factually with said 
compensable claims and counterclaims. 
26. The remaining $37,525.07 represents reasonable attorneys fees for the 
unsuccessful defense of compensable counterclaims, and the successful prosecution or defense of 
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noncompensable claims or counterclaims in this matter which did not overlap factually with any of 
the compensable claims or counterclaims upon which RTNC prevailed. 
27. RTNC's cost for the court-ordered mediation was $525.00. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs complies with 
the requirements of Rule 4-505, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, with this Court's August 8, 
2000, Minute Entry, and with applicable case law. It is otherwise sufficient to meet RTNC's 
burden of proof in supporting its requested award. 
2. The $525.00 incurred by RTNC for the court-ordered mediation is a 
recoverable cost under Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be taxed as a cost as 
against both defendants, jointly and severally. 
3. The compensable claims and counterclaims in this litigation were the 
parties' respective claims that the other had breached the modified written Services Agreement. 
4. As the prevailing party, RTNC is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys 
fees for: 
a. successfully prosecuting or defending these compensable claims or 
counterclaims; 
b. successfully prosecuting or defending noncompensable claims or 
counterclaims which overlapped factually with the aforesaid compensable claims 
and counterclaims; and, 
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c general litigation efforts not directly related to specific claim or 
counterclaim 
5. RTNC is not entitled to recover attorneys fees associated with its 
unsuccessful defense of compensable counterclaims, nor for its successful prosecution or defense 
of noncompensable claims or counterclaims which did not overlap factually with compensable 
claims or counterclaims upon which it prevailed. 
6. Reasonable attorneys through September 5, 2000, for successfully 
prosecuting or defending the compensable claims or counterclaims and overlapping 
noncompensable claims or counterclaims in this matter were $195,800.93. 
7. RTNC is entitled to judgment for attorneys fees in said amount against both 
defendants, jointly and severally, and for the damages heretofore awarded by the jury, for Rule 
54(d) costs awarded by the Court, and for pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as allowed by 
law 
DATED this H day of December, 2000. 
Approved as to Form-
Blake S Atkin 
JonathonL Hawkins 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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PUIS DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 2 0 2000 
Craig C. Coburn [A0688] 
Russell C. Fericks [A3793] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for R. T. Nielson Company 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801)531-2000 
Facsimile: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R. T. NIELSON COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MERRILL COOK, et al., 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 970904869CV 
Hon. Sandra N. Peuler 
This action came on for trial before the Court and a jury, the Hon. Sandra N. 
Peuler presiding, and the jury having duly rendered its verdict, and the Court having ruled that 
plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys fees and costs, it is ordered and adjudged that Plaintiff 
R.T. Nielson Co. recover: 
1. From defendants Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee, jointly and 
severally: 
By. 
/ \ Deputy Cl< A. Ctartc 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS/ 
DATE [>- ly^/oV 
970904869 coST^mLL 
a. the sum of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED 
SIXTY-TWO AND NO HUNDREDTHS DOLLARS ($162,962.00), together 
with accrued prejudgment interest on said sum through November 30, 2000, in the 
amount of SLXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND SDC HUNDRED NINETEEN AND 
NINETY-SDC HUNDREDTHS DOLLARS ($67,619.96), and prejudgment 
interest accruing from and after said date through the date this Judgment is signed 
and entered at the rate of $44.65 per day (10% apr); 
b. attorneys fees through September 5, 2000, in the amount of ONE HUNDRED 
NINETY-FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND NINETY-THREE 
HUNDREDTHS DOLLARS ($195,800.93); and 
c. Rule 54(b) costs in the amount of FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED 
NINETY-NTNE AND 85/100 DOLLARS ($4,899.85). 
2. From defendant Merrill Cook, the principal sum of ELEVEN THOUSAND FIVE 
HUNDRED NINE AND NO HUNDREDTHS DOLLARS ($11,509.00), together 
accrued prejudgment interest on said principal sum through November 30, 2000, in the 
amount of FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY AND SLXTY-SIX 
HUNDREDTHS DOLLARS ($4,350.66), and prejudgment interest accruing from and 
after said date through the date this Judgment is signed and entered at the rate of $3.15 
per day (10% apr); 
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3. This Judgment shall bear post-judgment interest at the rate of 7.67%. 
The last known addresses of the judgment debtors are: 
Merrill A. Cook 
631 East 16* Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103-3704 
DATED this 1^ day of. 
Merrill Cook for Congress Committee 
345 South Moffat Court 
Salt Lake City, UT 848411 
, , 2000. 
Approved as to Form: 
By the Court: 
O^nrsr/^yK^^f^MA^AA^—) 
Hon. Sandra N. Peuler 
Third Judicial District Court 
Blake S. Atkin 
Jonathon L. Hawkins 
Attorneys for Defendants 
302674 
13704.0001 
